Summary
Will China Be the Next Target? US Considers Secondary Tariffs on Russian Oil Beyond India is an emerging geopolitical and economic issue centered on the United States’ expanding use of secondary tariffs as a tool to enforce sanctions against Russia’s energy sector. In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its reliance on oil revenues to finance military operations, the US has imposed a series of sanctions targeting Russian oil producers and related industries. To prevent circumvention of these sanctions, Washington introduced secondary tariffs in 2025, initially targeting India for continuing to purchase discounted Russian crude despite existing sanctions. These tariffs impose additional import duties on goods from countries that trade with Russia, effectively pressuring third-party nations to cease their involvement in Russian oil trade.
The prospect of extending secondary tariffs to China—the world’s largest buyer of Russian oil—has drawn significant international attention and concern. China’s growing imports of Russian crude have helped Moscow mitigate the impact of Western sanctions, supported in part by complex evasion tactics such as the use of a “shadow fleet” of tankers with opaque ownership structures to conceal oil origins. The US views China’s continued purchases as a critical loophole undermining the sanctions regime, prompting consideration of steep tariffs on Chinese exports as leverage to compel Beijing to reduce or halt Russian oil imports. However, the intertwined economic relationship between the US and China complicates enforcement, as tariffs risk escalating trade tensions and harming both economies.
China has responded firmly to US threats, emphasizing its sovereign right to secure energy supplies and denouncing coercive measures as ineffective and counterproductive. Chinese officials have warned that such tariffs could disrupt global energy markets and destabilize international trade relations. Meanwhile, India has criticized the secondary tariffs imposed on its exports, highlighting the broader diplomatic challenges posed by these sanctions and the delicate balance the US must maintain between sanction enforcement and geopolitical stability.
These developments underscore the evolving nature of US sanctions policy, marking a strategic escalation from direct sanctions on Russia to punitive economic measures targeting third-party countries involved in Russian energy trade. The debate over secondary tariffs encapsulates complex questions about the effectiveness of sanctions, the limits of economic coercion, and the intricate dynamics of global energy markets amid ongoing geopolitical conflict.
Background
In response to Russia’s ongoing conflict and its significant role in global energy markets, the United States has increasingly utilized economic sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector. These measures include blocking sanctions on major Russian oil producers such as Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, which together represent a substantial portion of Russia’s oil output and exports. The sanctions aim to curtail Russia’s oil revenues, which are a critical source of funding for its military operations.
To circumvent these sanctions, Russia has developed a complex system involving a so-called “shadow fleet”—a network of hundreds of tankers with opaque ownership structures used to conceal the origin of its oil and gas exports. This tactic enables Russia and its trading partners to evade secondary sanctions and maintain their trade flows despite the increasing restrictions.
In 2025, the U.S. escalated its efforts by imposing secondary tariffs targeting countries that continue to purchase Russian oil. India became the first nation to face these penalties when President Trump signed an executive order imposing an additional 25% ad valorem tariff on Indian imports, effectively doubling the reciprocal tariff rate to 50% as a penalty for its continued Russian oil purchases. This move reflects a significant shift in U.S. sanctions policy, aiming to deter countries from supporting the Russian energy sector and thereby weakening Russia’s financial capacity to sustain its war effort.
The imposition of these secondary tariffs is intended not only to punish direct purchasers of Russian oil but also to pressure their trading partners by threatening a 100% import tax on goods originating from any country engaged in such trade when those goods enter the U.S. market. This approach highlights the challenge of sanctions maintenance, which experts argue is as demanding as the initial imposition of sanctions.
While India has been the initial target of these secondary sanctions, there is growing speculation and concern that China—Russia’s largest oil customer—may soon face similar measures. The disruption of discounted Russian oil flows to China and India has already revived demand for Middle Eastern and African crude, causing fluctuations in shipping markets and contributing to rising global oil prices. The potential expansion of secondary tariffs to China raises complex geopolitical and economic considerations for the U.S., which must balance sanction enforcement with maintaining trade relations and managing domestic economic impacts.
These developments form the backdrop to the ongoing debate over the use and efficacy of secondary sanctions as a foreign policy tool aimed at aligning global actors with U.S. sanctions objectives and curbing Russia’s ability to finance its military activities through energy exports.
Proposal and Implementation of Secondary Tariffs
The concept of secondary tariffs emerged as a novel approach within U.S. trade policy, designed to extend punitive measures beyond the directly targeted country by imposing duties on third-party nations that continue trade with the sanctioned state. Unlike primary tariffs, which directly target imports from a specific country, secondary tariffs penalize countries or entities engaging in trade with that targeted nation, effectively pressuring them to align with U.S. sanctions objectives.
During the second Trump administration, secondary tariffs gained prominence as a strategic tool aimed at discouraging countries from purchasing Russian oil. In March 2025, President Trump signed an executive order authorizing a 25% tariff on goods from countries buying Venezuelan oil, setting a precedent for similar measures. Subsequently, he threatened secondary tariffs on countries trading with Russia and Iran, reflecting an expanded use of economic pressure to influence global energy markets and foreign policy behavior.
The first concrete implementation of secondary tariffs occurred on August 6, 2025, when President Trump issued an executive order titled Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation. This order imposed an additional 25% ad valorem tariff on imports from India, responding to India’s continued purchases and resale of Russian oil. While not formally labeled as “secondary sanctions,” the measure closely mirrored their intent and structure, aiming to disincentivize India from undermining U.S. sanctions against Russia and impacting Russia’s war effort.
Following the executive order, the U.S. government stipulated that if the secondary tariffs took effect as planned in 21 days, U.S. companies importing Indian goods would face an effective 100% import tax due to the layered tariffs. The rationale was to significantly increase the cost of Indian exports to the U.S., encouraging American businesses to source products from alternative suppliers and thereby inflicting economic pressure on India to cease its purchases of Russian oil.
This policy move reflected a broader U.S. strategy to leverage trade tools, including secondary tariffs, to enforce sanctions compliance indirectly by targeting third-party countries with significant trade ties to Russia. Analysts noted that such measures represent a shift toward more targeted and financially coercive sanctions that seek to disrupt global supply chains benefiting sanctioned nations.
While the primary target of these secondary tariffs was India, speculation and analysis suggested that China could be the next potential target of similar measures, given its substantial purchases of Russian energy resources. Experts highlighted that the use of secondary tariffs could provide strong financial incentives for countries like China to reduce or halt their imports of Russian oil, aligning with U.S. sanctions goals and exerting additional economic pressure on Russia.
Trends in Russian Oil Exports to China
Russia’s oil exports to China have experienced notable fluctuations influenced by Western sanctions and shifting global energy dynamics. In response to sanctions limiting Russia’s ability to ship oil and receive payments, China has increasingly become a critical destination for Russian crude, alongside Iran, allowing China to save an estimated ten billion dollars by purchasing oil from these sanctioned countries in 2023.
Despite this growing reliance, recent developments indicate a potential decline in Russian oil volumes to China. Stricter regulations at key Chinese ports such as Qingdao and Rizhao, coupled with a reduced number of counterparties and insurers willing to facilitate these transactions, have led state refiners in China to likely avoid Russian oil in certain segments. One source estimated that Russian exports to China could fall by approximately 700,000 to 800,000 barrels per day starting March 2024, following the expiration of sanctions waivers.
Nonetheless, overall Russian crude imports into China reached a record high in early 2024, with volumes rising by 1% compared to 2023. According to China’s General Administration of Customs, Russian supplies, including both pipeline and seaborne oil, totaled around 108.5 million metric tons, equivalent to 2.17 million barrels per day. This increase coincided with a 9% reduction in imports from Saudi Arabia, as Chinese refiners sought discounted Russian crude to cope with narrowing margins.
Amid tightening sanctions, major buyers such as China and India are exploring alternative mechanisms to sustain oil trade with Russia. These include transitioning to national currencies, developing independent insurance systems, and establishing dedicated logistics hubs. Such efforts point to the possibility of a fully independent financial and logistical framework for trading Russian oil within the BRICS context, aimed at circumventing Western restrictions and the G7-imposed price cap on Russian oil exports.
At the same time, Russia’s use of a “shadow fleet” — hundreds of tankers with opaque ownership structures — has facilitated continued shipments of sanctioned oil to China and India. This fleet allows Russia to conceal the origin of exported oil, mitigating some impacts of the sanctions and price caps imposed by Western countries. However, the new sanctions and related enforcement efforts are expected to significantly challenge Russian oil exports, potentially forcing Chinese independent refiners to reduce their processing of Russian crude in the near future.
Strategic Concerns and Rationale for US Measures
The United States’ consideration of secondary tariffs on countries beyond India, particularly targeting China, stems from strategic concerns over the effectiveness and enforcement of existing sanctions on Russian oil. The new sanctions directly target major Russian oil producers such as Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, which together account for roughly 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) of output and 1 million bpd of exports, marking a significant escalation in US efforts to curb Russia’s energy revenues. However, the global nature of energy trade and the involvement of third-party countries in indirect or resale transactions complicate enforcement, prompting the US to signal potential additional pressure on countries engaged in such activities.
A central rationale for these measures is the concern that indirect trade relationships, particularly involving large energy importers like China, could undermine the sanctions regime. China’s role in purchasing discounted Russian oil, often facilitated through covert means such as the so-called “shadow fleet” of tankers with obscure ownership, raises fears that sanctions evasion tactics are weakening the intended economic pressure on Russia. This shadow fleet allows Russia to obscure the origin of its oil exports, complicating monitoring and enforcement efforts.
Moreover, the intertwined economic relationship between the US and China amplifies the complexity of imposing sanctions. Analysts argue that attempts to decouple these economies have proven futile given decades of deep trade integration, making China’s cooperation crucial for the success of sanctions. The use of secondary tariffs, a policy tool that penalizes third-party countries for trading with sanctioned states, could provide strong financial incentives for countries like China to reduce or cease their purchase of Russian oil. This approach represents a strategic escalation intended to close loopholes in the sanctions framework and further isolate Russia economically by targeting its key trade partners.
China’s Official Response and Strategies
Following two days of trade negotiations in Stockholm, China’s Foreign Ministry issued a firm statement emphasizing that the country “will always ensure its energy supply in ways that serve our national interests” in response to the U.S. threat of imposing a 100% tariff. The ministry underscored that “coercion and pressuring will not achieve anything” and pledged to “firmly defend its sovereignty, security and development interests,” signaling a strong stance against external economic pressures. This response came at a time when both Beijing and Washington were expressing cautious optimism about reaching a trade deal to stabilize commercial relations between the world’s two largest economies after a period marked by elevated tariffs and harsh trade restrictions.
China’s posture during these negotiations reflects its confidence in leveraging its sovereign control over energy procurement, particularly in the context of Russian oil purchases, which have been a contentious issue for the United States. U.S. Treasury officials have noted China’s serious approach to maintaining its sovereignty on this matter, illustrating the challenges Washington faces in trying to influence Beijing’s energy decisions through trade-related sanctions or tariffs.
The Chinese embassy in the United States reiterated this position by condemning what it described as “illegal and unjustifiable unilateral sanctions and so-called long-arm jurisdiction by the US,” emphasizing that “tariff wars have no winners” and warning that coercive measures would be counterproductive. This rhetoric aligns with broader analyses suggesting that efforts to decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies are largely futile given their deep economic interdependence, particularly in trade and energy sectors.
Furthermore, China’s strategic approach appears to be rooted in maintaining stable energy supplies and safeguarding national interests while resisting external coercion. This strategy is evident in the country’s response to potential secondary tariffs targeting its imports of Russian oil, where China’s government has signaled a clear refusal to yield to pressure that would jeopardize its energy security. Overall, China’s official response highlights a commitment to protecting its economic sovereignty and resisting trade measures perceived as attempts at undue interference.
Impact on International Relations
The imposition of secondary tariffs by the United States, initially targeting India for its purchases of Russian oil, has significant ramifications for international relations, particularly with major global players such as China. President Trump’s announcement of a 25% tariff on Indian exports beginning September 17, 2025, marked the first use of these secondary tariffs under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), signaling potential expansion to other countries engaged in indirect trade with Russia.
China, a key global economic power and major purchaser of Russian energy, has openly rejected U.S. demands to cease its oil imports from Russia and Iran, framing energy procurement as a sovereign right crucial to its national interests. Following recent trade negotiations in Stockholm, the Chinese Foreign Ministry publicly affirmed its stance against coercion and pressure, emphasizing the defense of its sovereignty, security, and development interests despite the threat of a 100% tariff by the U.S.. This response highlights a broader challenge for the United States: while there is optimism regarding trade relations between the two countries, energy policy remains a contentious issue that underpins much of the diplomatic friction.
Both China and India assert that their purchases comply with existing international frameworks, such as the price cap on Russian crude, and consider energy imports a sovereign matter. Furthermore, these countries possess significant leverage in their trade relations with the United States—China through critical mineral exports and India via generic pharmaceuticals and precursor chemicals—creating a complex interdependence that complicates the enforcement of U.S. secondary tariffs.
Experts have warned that aggressive tariff measures, especially a full 100% tariff on countries importing Russian oil, could disrupt global energy markets by reducing supply and increasing prices. This dynamic threatens broader economic stability and could provoke retaliatory actions, further straining diplomatic ties. Russia’s role as the world’s third-largest oil producer adds to the complexity, as declining shipments amid sanctions pressure affect global supply chains and geopolitics.
Economic Implications
The prospect of the United States imposing secondary tariffs on countries beyond India, such as China, for their imports of Russian oil carries significant economic implications. These secondary tariffs aim to deter nations from purchasing Russian energy by imposing steep import taxes on goods originating from those countries. For example, U.S. companies buying products from India could face a 100% tariff, making those goods prohibitively expensive and incentivizing buyers to seek alternatives. This mechanism is intended to reduce revenues flowing to Russia from oil exports and curtail funding for its war efforts.
However, such measures risk adverse economic effects for both the targeted countries and the U.S. The imposition of secondary tariffs could lead to higher prices for American consumers, as tariff increases are frequently passed on through supply chains. Studies of past trade conflicts, such as the U.S.-China trade war, reveal that U.S. consumers bore much of the cost of tariffs through increased prices, which contributed to a decline in real income for both nations, albeit relatively modest compared to GDP. The
Reactions and Opinions
The prospect of the United States considering secondary tariffs on Russian oil beyond India has elicited a range of reactions reflecting the complexities of global trade and geopolitics. China’s response has been particularly assertive, emphasizing its determination to protect national interests in energy security. Following trade negotiations in Stockholm, China’s Foreign Ministry stated on social media that “China will always ensure its energy supply in ways that serve our national interests” and that “coercion and pressuring will not achieve anything,” underscoring a firm stance against U.S. attempts to restrict its oil purchases from Russia. This position highlights China’s confidence in resisting U.S. pressure and maintaining sovereignty over its trade decisions, especially given the strategic importance of energy in its foreign policy.
From the U.S. perspective, officials recognize the difficulty of decoupling from China economically, as the two economies remain deeply intertwined despite ongoing trade tensions. The Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Zongyuan Zoe Liu noted the “futility of decoupling efforts,” which policymakers have become increasingly aware of over recent decades. Nevertheless, the U.S. continues to signal optimism about stabilizing commercial ties with China after scaling back on tariffs and trade restrictions, even as it insists on curbing China’s purchases of Russian oil.
Regarding India, the imposition of tariffs has sparked criticism from Indian exporters and political leaders. The Federation of India Exports Organisations described the new levies as “extremely shocking,” warning that 55% of India’s exports to the U.S. could be affected. President Trump publicly criticized India’s trade barriers and its continued procurement of Russian military equipment and energy, despite the two countries’ historically friendly relations. This framework of sanctions and tariffs also signals potential U.S. pressure on other countries involved in indirect or resale trade of Russian oil, with future U.S. evaluations focusing on the scale and strategic impact of such imports.
Historical Context and Precedents
The use of economic sanctions by the United States as a foreign policy tool has a long history, particularly in relation to China. Since 1949, U.S. sanctions against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been implemented for various foreign policy reasons, including human rights concerns, nonproliferation, and aggression. Following a period of nearly non-existent relations after World War II, normalization began in 1971 with the easing of trade and travel restrictions, culminating in the lifting of the trade embargo under President Richard Nixon in 1972, coinciding with the opening of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
However, sanctions have been reimposed or maintained in response to specific events. Notably, after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the George H.W. Bush administration imposed an arms embargo against China. Additionally, the U.S. has sanctioned and prosecuted Chinese entities accused of providing material support to Iran’s missile program, reflecting concerns about proliferation and regional security.
In recent years, the U.S. has expanded its use of sanctions to include secondary measures targeting countries that engage economically with sanctioned states. Secondary sanctions impose penalties on third-party countries or entities that purchase restricted goods, such as Russian oil. This strategy aims to isolate sanctioned countries economically by discouraging global partners from conducting trade with them. For example, tightened U.S. sanctions on Moscow disrupted the discounted trade of Russian oil to China and India, leading to increased demand for alternative sources such as Middle Eastern and African crude oil and affecting global shipping markets.
The U.S. Senate has shown bipartisan support for escalating secondary sanctions, including proposals for tariffs as high as 500% on imports of Russian oil, natural gas, uranium, and other exports by countries that continue to trade with Russia. This approach underscores a broader U.S. strategy to pressure not only the sanctioned state but also those facilitating its economic resilience.
Despite these efforts, trade negotiations between the U.S. and China have revealed significant points of contention, particularly regarding China’s continued energy purchases from Iran and Russia. The U.S. has threatened punitive tariffs—up to 100%—to deter such transactions, but China maintains that it will secure its energy supplies according to its national interests. This persistent economic interdependence highlights the challenges of decoupling and the limitations of sanctions as a tool to reshape global trade relationships.
Future Prospects
The introduction of new U.S. sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector has intensified the geopolitical and economic complexities surrounding global oil trade. These measures include blocking sanctions on major Russian oil producers Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, and restrictions on insurers and energy-related payments, aiming to reinforce the existing G7 oil price cap mechanism. However, the sanctions have also catalyzed shifts in trade patterns, with countries like India and China exploring alternative trading systems that may bypass traditional financial and logistical channels, including the creation of dedicated hubs within frameworks such as BRICS.
Despite the pressure from Washington, the intertwined nature of U.S.-China trade relations complicates the imposition of secondary tariffs on Chinese oil imports from Russia. Analysts argue that the economic interdependence between the two countries makes efforts at decoupling increasingly difficult. The U.S. is considering broad secondary tariffs that could impose duties on a wide range of Chinese exports, potentially serving as a financial deterrent against continued Russian oil purchases. Such measures would mark a significant escalation in the use of economic tools to enforce sanctions and could force countries to reevaluate their energy procurement strategies.
Negotiations between the U.S. and China have shown some promise in reducing tariffs and stabilizing trade ties, but remain deadlocked on the issue of China’s oil imports from Russia and Iran. China has publicly affirmed its commitment to securing energy supplies in ways that serve its national interests and has rejected U.S. demands to cease purchasing Russian oil. The Chinese government has underscored its sovereignty and expressed resistance to coercive tactics, highlighting the strategic importance of energy security in its foreign policy.
The persistence of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”—a network of tankers operating outside conventional regulatory oversight—further complicates enforcement efforts. This fleet enables Russia to obscure the origins of its energy exports, challenging the effectiveness of sanctions and necessitating ongoing vigilance and adjustment in sanction regimes. As a result, maintaining sanctions is increasingly recognized as a task that requires as much attention and resources as their initial imposition.
Looking ahead, the potential use of secondary tariffs against China represents a significant escalation in U.S. efforts to limit Russian energy revenues. However, the geopolitical realities and economic interdependencies suggest that such measures could provoke retaliatory actions and complicate broader trade relations. The development of independent financial and logistical systems by countries like India and China to facilitate Russian oil trade signals a shift toward alternative global energy markets, potentially diminishing the long-term efficacy of Western sanctions. These dynamics indicate that while the U.S. aims to curtail Russian energy exports through expanded sanctions, the evolving international landscape will require adaptive and multifaceted approaches to address the challenges ahead.
The content is provided by Blake Sterling, 11 Minute Read
